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Abstract
This paper investigates whether consumption of alcoholic beverages aﬀects distribu-
tion of resources among household members. We refer to this eﬀect as passive drinking
eﬀect, highlighting the negative impact that alcohol addicted individuals can have on
other household members’ wellbeing. To investigate this issue we rely on the collective
framework and estimate a structural collective demand system. Our results show that
for Italian households a high level of alcohol consumption influences the allocation of
resources in favour of the husband, with a larger eﬀect in poor households. This evidence
implies that alcohol consumption is not only an individual problem. Public costs that are
transferred to the other household members should be taken into account when designing
social policies.
JEL Classification Codes: C31,C34,C51,D12,D13.
Keywords: collective model, demand system, sharing rule, alcohol consumption,
intra-household resources distribution, policy implications.
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1 Introduction
This paper addresses the issue of whether a high level of individual alcohol consumption2
leads to negative economic consequences for other members of the household. The analogy
with passive smoking is direct, but the transmission mechanism of the passive eﬀect is less
evident. It depends both on the behaviour of the drinker and the reduced amount of available
resources.
In general, the analysis of consumption of addictive substances should be conducted
through an intertemporal framework at the individual level. In fact, the process leading to
addiction is strictly private and depends on the quantities consumed by the person itself in
the past (Becker and Murphy, 1988; Epstein and Shi, 1993; Gruber and Köszegi, 2001). This
is also related to the fact of considering alcohol as a bad rather than a good. A person may
enjoy moderate drinking without suﬀering any side eﬀect, while heavy drinkers may suﬀer
diseases and several other problems. Therefore, for heavy drinkers it is not clear whether
alcohol consumption generates utility, disutility or a mixture of both. In extreme cases,
the individual may choose to drink because the disutility of not drinking is higher than the
disutility of drinking.
So, from an individualistic point of view the household is often escluded from the analysis,
playing at most a secondary role and considered simply as part of the environment in which
the individual develops addiction. On the other hand, focussing the analysis on the household,
the other members (non-heavy-drinkers) may suﬀer both a modified behavior of the drinker
and the reduced resources available for them. In both cases, alcohol is a bad for them, not a
good, and significantly aﬀects the overall household welfare. In the present work we aim at
giving the household the central role that it deserves as a potential victim of a social injustice.
For instance, the old times English “egoistic” husband on Friday evening used to drink
his wage at the pub, bringing no bread to the wife and the children (Seccombe, 1995).
A similar example is given in Borelli and Perali (2002) for households of Djibouti, where
husbands spend much of their wage on a legal drug, the qat, depriving other members of
basic needs. As suggested by these examples, intra-household distribution of resources is
a relevant determinant of a household’s welfare. Several negative “household internalities”
caused by alcohol consumption, such as episodes of violence, misunderstandings, lack of
attention, health problems, increased probability of car crashes, and so on, also suggest the
need of a policy intervention. However, while these negative consequences are diﬃcult to
measure and evaluate economically, the intra-household distribution of resources is a reliable
way to measure the negative impact that alcohol consumption can have on household welfare.
The analytical tool that we adopt to study this issue is the collective framework of Chiappori
(1988).
The adopted estimation strategy is similar to the one proposed by Browning, Bour-
guignon, Chiappori, and Lechene (1994), where the estimation of a collective consumption
models is performed.3 We test, through the estimation of a structural collective demand
system, whether a high level of alcohol consumption induces a modification of the “sharing
1ReAct (Research Group on Addiction) - http://dse.univr.it/addiction
2 In the paper we will refer to consumption of goods and expenditures interchangeably. In the data, however,
we only observe good expenditures and not consumed quantities.
3Cherchye, de Rock, and Vermeulen (2008) also estimate a collective consumption model, but for the
identification of the sharing rule they rely on a diﬀerent set of assumptions, which makes our study not
directly comparable to their work.
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rule” with respect to households in which alcohol is not consumed. For instance, in some
households, a despotic heavy drinker may take decisions regardless of other member’s needs.
This situation may occur when a strong habit of alcohol consumption is present and a part
of household resources is devoted to the daily measure of alcohol, and hence not available for
other members. In these cases a policy intervention, aimed at restoring a more egalitarian
intra-household distribution of resources, obtained reducing consumption of the vicious good
and/or through gender specific policies, may be auspicable.
To our knowledge, in the literature there are no previous empirical studies on the link
between alcohol consumption and the intra-household distribution of resources. Though we
cannot compare our results with previous works, our findings are meaningful. According to
our estimates, alcohol consumption significantly aﬀects the intra-household distribution of
resources which is biased towards the husband, especially for low income households. The
results of this work seem to suggest that on average men tend to be more inclined to over-
bearing behaviors when alcohol is consumed. Moreover, since from our estimation alcoholic
beverages have a small own-price elasticity, a policy intervention of increased taxation on
alcoholics may have a poor impact on consumption. Therefore, a policy intervention to in-
crease the bargaining power of the wife within the household may result more eﬀective in
curbing male alcohol consumption.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework of
Collective Choice Models and the demand system specification. Section 3 deals with the
econometric method which will be applied. Section 4 describes the data used, Section 5
shows the results and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model of Collective Choice
The collective framework (Chiappori, 1988, 1992) extends the unitary framework by explicitly
modelling the household as a collection of individuals. This is obtained by introducing a
sharing rule governing the allocation of resources among household members. Chiappori
(1988, 1992) shows that for the identification of the sharing rule it is suﬃcient to observe
the private consumption of at least one assignable good. This is as if the researcher were
capable to observe the individual consumption, i.e. as if a household member was living
alone. Browning, Chiappori, and Lewbel (2007) exploit this analogy to recover the sharing
rule when household data do not record the private consumption of assignable goods. They
estimate first the preferences of singles and then, assuming that an individual does not vary
her preferences when changing marital status from single to married, the sharing rule. It
should be noticed that this approach allows the recovery of the rule governing the allocation
of resources across adult members of the household, but it is not possible to deduce the
allocation rule between adults and children, because children never live alone.
Considering this limitation and that alcohol consumption of a young person living alone is
structurally diﬀerent from the consumption of an adult person living in a household, we choose
the estimation approach by Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) extended to consumption
as formulated in the subsequent section.
2.1 Theoretical Framework
In general, unitary models maximize a household utility function, which depends on consumed
quantities of market goods, subject to a budget constraint. Consumption of single individuals
within the household is not modeled and income pooling is assumed, that is individual incomes
are put together to finance household expenditures and the final outcome is not aﬀected by
who has control over economic resources in the family. Within the collective theory the
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decision taker is not the household as a whole but its members individually. This allows to
have a representation of the household in which each member has its own preferences. In
this context, it is possible to explain the intra-household distribution of resources through a
function called sharing rule.
Assume that the household is composed by two members, the husband (m) and the
wife (f). In principle, each of them can receive a labour income, which, together with any
non-labour income, contributes to the household income yh. Then the spouses, through a
bargaining process, decide how to divide the household income into the two quantities φm
and φf ,
4 which represent the sharing rule.
Each member of the household may consume part of the goods purchased for the household
oh at prices po or consume some exclusive goods ek, with k = m, f whose prices are pk.5
The exclusive goods may be male and female clothing,6 which are consumed by the husband
and the wife exclusively.
The individual k maximizes his utility Uk accordins to the following program
maxek,ok U
k(ek,ok;θk) (1)
s.t. p0ke
k + p0ook ≤ φk
ek,ok ≥ 0
k = m,f ;
which leads to the following Marshallian demand functions xkj = x
k
j (φk,pk,po;θk), where xkj
is the demand of the k − th household member for good j, and j can be any good in ek or
ok.
In principle we could estimate these demand functions separately, but in practice this is
not feasible, since microeconomic datasets are collected at the household level. Moreover,
even if individual expenditure is collected, it is diﬃcult to assign an individual consumption
to each good, since some goods are for their own nature public goods, while others, such as
food, are in any case shared with all household’s member.
On the other hand, several datasets collect information on individual expenditure for
some goods only, which is still a suﬃcient condition to identify the sharing rule (Bourguignon,
1999). This suggests that it is possible to construct a household demand system which takes
into account for individual income eﬀects (thanks to the sharing rule) and to recover at least
some of the individual preferences parameters.
Considering that the household consumption vector x and the price vector p are
x =
⎡
⎣
em
ef
om + of
⎤
⎦ and p =
⎡
⎣
pm
pf
po
⎤
⎦ ,
the household demand system can be specified by adding up individual demands, so that
xj(φm, φf ,pm,pf ,po;θm,θf ) = xmj (φm,pm,po;θm) + x
f
j (φf ,pf ,po;θf ). (2)
We can now define the demand system specification, which will be used in the empirical
exercise.
4Note that, being φm and φf quantities, not relative measures, they are chosen such that φm + φf = yh.
5 In this study, we do not take into account public household goods, as housing, travelling costs and so on.
The reason is that the inclusion of such goods implies further complications which could cause identification
issues for the sharing rule. See Browning, Chiappori, and Lewbel (2007) for a detailed discussion.
6 In the literature, the most used exclusive good is leisure, which can provide the needed information for
the indentification of the sharing rule within a labour supply model.
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3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 The Collective Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System
The chosen demand system is an extension to the Almost Ideal Demand System originally
proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). The model is extended with the introduction
of a quadratic income term, following Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1997).7 Demographic
characteristics interact multiplicatively with income in a theoretically plausible way (Barten,
1964; Gorman, 1976; Lewbel, 1985). The model is called “collective” because it incorporates
the sharing rule through individual incomes for the two members of the household.
The following equation shows the budget share equation of the demand function for
good i according to the specification of the collective quadratic almost ideal demand system
(CQAIDS) derived in Appendix B
wi = αi + ti(d) +
X
j
γji ln pj + β
m
i (lnφ
∗
m − ln a(p)) (3)
+
λmi
bm(p)
(lnφ∗m − ln a(p))
2 + βfi
¡
lnφ∗f − ln a(p)
¢
+
λfi
bf (p)
¡
lnφ∗f − ln a(p)
¢2 ,
where wi is the household budget share of good i, αi, γij , βi and λi are parameters, pj is
the price of good j, φ∗m and φ
∗
f are scaled individual expenditures determined by the sharing
rule, a(p) and b(p) are two price indexes, t(d) is a translating function and d is a vector of
demographic variables or household characteristics. The individual scaled total expenditures
are defined as
lnφ∗m = lnφm(pm, pf , yh, z)−
X
i
ti(d) ln pi, (4)
lnφ∗f = lnφf (pm, pf , yh, z)−
X
i
ti(d) ln pi,
where φm(·) and φf (·) are function of the household expenditure yh, prices of the exclusive
goods pm and pf , and a vector of exogenous variables called distribution factors z, and pi is
price of good i.8
In order to comply with homogeneity properties of the demand system, the demographic
specification of the budget share demand system is subject to a number of restrictions on the
parameters. In particular, the following restrictions must holdX
i
αi = 1;
X
i
βi = 0;
X
i
λi = 0;
X
i
γij = 0;
X
j
γij = 0; γij = γji;
X
i
τ ir = 0.
This specification is consistent with the collective model stated in the previous section
(equation 2) and allows to estimate individual income parameters βmi , β
f
i , λ
m
i and λ
f
i . Yet, it
is not possible to estimate individual parameters for αi, γji and the parameters of the scaling
function ti(d), which are then estimated at the household level.
In the following section we discuss the identification of the sharing rule.
3.2 Specification of the Sharing Rule
In the specification of the CQAIDS described by equations (3) and (4), φm(·) and φf (·) are
not observed variables: recovering the structure of the sharing rule is one of the objective of
7The choice is motivated in Appendix A, which provides evidence for a rank 3 demand system.
8Distribution factors are exogenous variables that can aﬀect the household behaviour only through their
impact on the decision process. In other words, the distribution factors do not aﬀect either the individual
preferences or the budget constraint. Examples of distribution factors used in empirical works are divorce
ratio and sex ratio (Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix, 2002), wealth at marriage (Contreras, Frankenberg, and
Thomas, .1997), and benefits (Rubalcava and Thomas, 2000).
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this paper. Since we specified the sharing rule as a generalized function of observed variables,
what we need is a parametric specification that when included in the demand system would
allow to identify its parameters (Goldberger, 1972). The main issue is to find a viable way
to use information on individual expenditures on some goods, which are recorded in several
household budget datasets.
If we observe expenditure on some goods which are exclusively consumed by one of the
household members, or for which a certain percentage can be certainly assigned to one of
them, than the expenditure on those goods can be considered as individual consumption, and
hence part of ek, as specified in equation (1). The other ordinaire goods, which are neither
exclusive nor assignable, belong to oh, which is assumed to be equally divided between the
spouses, that is om = of = 12o
h.
Given the observed individual expenditure as p0mem + p0o
1
2o
h and p0fe
f + p0o
1
2o
h, it is
possible to construct an index ω ∈ [0, 1] which determines the observed share of husband
expenditure on total household expenditure
ωm =
p0mem + p0o
1
2o
h
yh
. (5)
This implicitly defines the wife share of household expenditure as ωf = 1− ωm and can
be used to define the individual expenditures yk as a function of household expenditure yh
as yk = ωkyh.
In the present work, to econometrically identify the sharing rule9 we use a technique
borrowed from Pollak and Wales (1981) and Lewbel (1985), commonly used to incorporate
demographic variables or exogenous factors into the demand functions, and from Bollino,
Perali, and Rossi (2000), applied to estimate household technologies. In general, the idea is
that demographic variables interact with exogenous prices or income and that their eﬀect can
be identified provided that suﬃcient variability is observed in the data.
Following this strategy, we define an income scaling function mk(pm, pf , z) a la Barten
(Barten, 1964; Perali, 2003), which relates the sharing rule φk(pm, pf , yh, z) to the observed
individual expenditure yk according to
φk(pm, pf , yh, z) = ykmk(pm, pf , z), for k = m, f. (6)
The estimation problem is similar to that of estimating a regression containing unobserv-
able independent variables (Goldberger, 1972).
With the CQAIDS in the budget share form, we express equation (6) in natural logarithm,
obtaining
lnφm(pm, pf , yh, z) = ln ym + lnmm(pm, pf , z) (7)
lnφm(pm, pf , yh, z) = ln yf + lnmf (pm, pf , z),
where mm(pm, pf , z) and mf (pm, pf , z) are the scaling functions of individual income yk.
The identifying assumption in the model is that the portion of income of each member,
ln ym and ln yf , can be recovered from observed expenditures on exclusive or assignable
goods. Namely, we define ln ym = ωm ln yh and ln yf = (1 − ωm) ln yh, which implies that
ln ym+ln yf = ln yh. Note that with respect to this definition of the individual expenditures,
the sharing rule should be considered a function determining the portion of the natural
logarithm of income assigned as well, such that lnφm(·) + lnφf (·) = ln yh.
9Recall that the minimal information required for the identification of the sharing rule is the observability
of at least one assignable good, or, equivalently, two exclusive goods (Bourguignon, 1999). If a good is
exclusive, and there are no externalities, for a given observed demand x(p, y) satisfying the Collective Slutsky
property (Chiappori, 1988, 1992; Chiappori and Ekeland, 2002, 2006), and such that the Jacobian Dpx(p, y)
is invertible, then the sharing rule is identified.
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The definitions of the sharing rule expressed in equation (7) and the fact that
X
k
lnφm =
ln yh are a key feature for the identification of the sharing rule. They imply that the following
condition must hold
lnmm(pm, pf , z) = − lnmf (pm, pf , z), (8)
which allows us to set lnmm(·) = lnm(·) and lnmf (·) = − lnm(·). In this way, only one set
of additional parameters belonging to the income scaling functionm(·) needs to be estimated,
identifying the sharing rule for both household members.
Given equations (7) and (8), it is possible to rewrite equations (4) as
lnφ∗m = ωm ln yh + lnm(pm, pf , z)−
X
i
ti(d) ln pi
lnφ∗f = (1− ωm) ln yh − lnm(pm, pf , z)−
X
i
ti(d) ln pi.
In analogy to function ti(d), function m(pm, pf , z) is identified provided there is enough
variation in the individual prices pm and pf and in the distribution factors z.10
In our empirical study, we specify m(pm, pf , z) as a Cobb-Douglas function, so that the
logarithmic specification is linear in the parameters
lnm(pm, pf , z) = φ0 ln pr +
XN
n=1
φn ln zn,
where pr is a price ratio, whose specification is given below, and N is the dimension of
vector z. With this specification there is an additional restriction, which is that distribution
factors z must diﬀer from the demographic variables d. If it were not so, the parameters
lnm(pm, pf , z) and ti(d) would not be identified for the variables that are shared by z and
d.
In the next section we specify the econometric strategy used to perform our estimates.
3.3 Zero Expenditure
Econometricians working with household micro-data often are faced to the zero expenditures
problem, especially when working with disaggregate goods, which is the case, for example, of
alcohol consumption, tobacco or clothing. Since coeﬃcient estimates are inconsistent when
only observed positive purchase data are used, the proper correction technique has to be
used.
The econometric methods dealing with the zero expenditure issue diﬀer for the assump-
tions related to the source of zero expenditures. For example, the Tobit model (Amemiya,
1985; Maddala, 1983) captures the corner solutions for the utility maximization problem,
which implies that the observation is zero just because the household decided not to consume
on the basis of disposable income, prices and preferences. This could be the case for some
goods, such as semi-durables, which may not be purchased in the reference period because
they give utility for more than one period and a household may need to buy them only few
times in a year. This situation is called infrequency of purchases.
On the other side, the Double-Hurdle model (Yen, 1993) assumes that zero expenditures
are explained by a decision process that arises from unobserved latent variables which drive
consumer choices. The model allows a separate estimation of participation and expenditure
parameters. This is the case of alcohol, which may not be consumed because of moral
conviction or health problems, which may not be observable in the survey. However, this
model is not useful when considering semi-durable goods.
10The proof is similar to proving that function ti(d) is identified, as shown in Gorman (1976), Lewbel (1985)
or Perali (2003).
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An alternative to the Double-Hurdle model is the Heckman two-step estimator, which
assumes that zero expenditures are due to sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979) and are
treated as a mispecification error. This approach allows for separate estimates of participation
and expenditure parameters.
In the original model, the first stage determines the participation probability using a
probit regression, and then, in the second stage, Heckman proposes a specification for the
omitted variable which can be used to correct the sample selection bias. The omitted variable
is the inverse Mill’s ratio, which is the ratio between density and cumulative probability
function of the standard normal distribution.
In this paper we use a generalization of the Heckman two-step estimator overcoming the
issues which emerge in Amemiya (1978, 1979) and Heien and Wessells (1990). In particular,
we refer to the work of Shonkwiler and Yen (1999), which proposes a consistent, though still
simple, two-step generalized Heckman estimator for a censored system of equations.
In choosing the proper estimator, we had to keep in mind that the dataset has zero
expenditures for two goods: alcohol and education and recreation. The double-hurdle model
is particularly well suited for alcohol consumption, which is what we are focussing on, but
is not general enough to consider other sources of zero expenditures. Hence, we decided
to use the generalized Heckman estimator, which is well suited for a rather large source
of zero expenditures, is consistent with a two-stages decision process similar to that of the
Double-Hurdle and keeps things simple.
Following Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) and Arias, Atella, Castagnini, and Perali (2003),
consider the following general limited dependent variables system of equations11
y∗it = f(xit, θi) + it, d
∗
it = z
0
itτ i + υit, (9)
dit =
½
1 if d∗it > 0
0 if d∗it ≤ 0
yit = dity∗it,
(i = 1, 2, ...,m; t = 1, 2, ..., T ),
where i represents the i-th equation and t the t-th observation, yit and dit are the observed
dependent variables, y∗it and d
∗
it are the latent variables, xit and zit are vectors of exogenous
variables, θi and τ i are parameters, and, it and υit are random errors. Without entering into
details, system (9) can be written as
yit = Ψ(z
0
itτ i)f(xit, θi) + ηiψ(z
0
itτ i) + ξit,
where Ψ(·) and ψ(·) are univariate normal standard cumulative distribution and probability
density functions respectively. The system can be estimated by means of a two-step proce-
dure, where τ i is estimated using a Maximum Likelihood probit estimator, and is used to
calculate Ψ(v0itτ i) and ψ(v
0
itτ i). Successively, estimates of θi and ηi in the system
yit = Ψ(z0itτˆ i)f(xit, θi) + ηiψ(z
0
itτˆ i) + ξit (10)
are obtained by Full Information Maximum Likelihood.
4 Data Description
The data used in this work is drawn from the Italian household expenditure survey (Con-
sumi delle Famiglie Italiane) for the period 2002-2004. We selected households composed
by married couples without dependent children with an observed positive consumption for
11Here we temporarily abandon the previous notation to explain the model.
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male and female clothing.12 To ensure a demographically homogeneous sample, we excluded
households in which at least one member is retired from work. In this way we restrict our
study to working couples with a similar lifestyle. The sample includes 1947 observations. The
dataset information has been matched with individual alcohol consumption data from ISTAT
2002 survey on the standard of living (Indagine Multiscopo su Stili di Vita e Condizioni di
Salute).13
In the latter dataset, information is collected on an individual basis. This feature allows
us to assign alcohol consumption respectively to the husband or to the wife. Clothing can be
exclusively assigned to the husband and the wife since male and female clothing is separately
recorded in the expenditure survey.
We consider only expenditure of non durable goods, hence the aggregated expenditure
categories considered are food, alcohol, clothing, education and recreation, and other goods.
Household-specific prices are assigned following the procedure described below.
Since the ISTAT survey records only expenditure information, the lack of information
about quantities purchased precludes the possibility to calculate household specific unit val-
ues. On the other hand, ISTAT’s price indexes have an aggregation level similar to that of
the survey, but are not suﬃcient to provide plausible elasticities. For this reason, we use a
procedure, originally proposed by Lewbel (1989) and applied by Atella, Menon, and Perali
(2003), to construct pseudo unit values.
Table 1 and Table 2 report the descriptive statistics of the sample. The set of demo-
graphic variables d includes macro regions (North-East, North-West and Center), a dummy
variable to capture seasonality (particularly Christmas time), a dummy variable indicating
if head households have a university or higher degree, a dummy variable to indicate that the
household does not live in urban areas (rural), a dummy variable indicating that husband
is an employee, a variable signaling if at least one in the couple smokes and two dummy
variables to control for possible diﬀerences in the year of relevation. The exogenous variables
chosen for the sharing rule are quite limited by the disposable information in the dataset and
are defined as follows. Thus the distribution factors z are the price ratio (price-r) is the price
of male clothing divided by the sum of male and female clothing prices, the age ratio (age-r)
is defined as husband’s age divided by the sum of both members ages, and the education
ratio (edu-r) is defined as husband’s years of schooling divided by the sum of both members
years of schooling.
In the next section we present the results and comments.
5 Results
This section describes the results coming from the estimation of model (10) where yit and
f(xit, θi) are replaced by wit and the right hand side of equation (3), respectively.
The estimates of the parameters are obtained by Full Information Maximum Likelihood
estimation of a collective Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System, as described in Section
3.1. Zero observed expenditures are corrected applying the generalized Heckman two-step
12We restrict to positive clothing expenditures because this is the source of identification for the sharing
rule. Using observations with no clothing expenditure would not add useful information for the identification
of the sharing rule.
13The imputation of the variable was conducted using a semi-parametric method.The technique works as
follows. Both samples share a number of variables which describe household characteristics. Divide both
samples in cells determined by the same household characteristics. To impute a variable, for each household
in the cell randomly pick up a value from the corresponding cell in the second sample. This method has two
particular advantages: first, zero observed expenditures are preserved, and second, the overall distribution of
the variable remains almost unchanged after imputation.
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estimator proposed by Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) as applied by Arias, Atella, Castagnini,
and Perali (2003).
Symmetry and homogeneity properties of the demand system are ensured by construction,
with the Slutsky matrix having two individual income terms which sum up to the household
income eﬀect.
In Table 4 we present the estimates of the CQAIDS demand system. In general, income
parameters (αi, βm, βf , λm, λf ) are significant with the exception of alcohol income pa-
rameters, which are non significant for the husband, and teh quadratic temrs of education
and recreation. The zero correction parameters ηi parameters are not significant, indicating
that the observed zero expenditures should not bias parameter estimates. Among the demo-
graphic variables, the general trend is towards small parameter values, even if many of them
are significantly diﬀerent from zero. The dummy variables included to control for the year of
relevation of the data are generally not significant.
The alcohol demand equation is insensible to most demographic variables. A positive
eﬀect is observed if the household lives in the north of Italy. This is as expected and is
cited in some ISTAT reports on alcohol consumption. The tendency is to relate diﬀerent
behavior to climate diﬀerences. In the south, a warmer temperature discourages consumption
of alcoholic beverages in summer, while during winter rigid northern temperatures tend to
favour consumption of spirits. A positive eﬀect is also observed for the seasonality control
variable. This is also as expected, since during winter holidays there is a strong increase in
champagne wine demand.
More interestingly, the education parameter is found to be non significant to explain
alcohol expenditure. In Italy it is common practice to drink a glass of wine at meals and a
moderate consumption of good quality wine is an encouraged behavior, and this could explain
the evidence. Hpwever, even if not signifincant, the parameter is negative, indicating that if
there had been an eﬀect it would have been as expected.
Contrary to what we expect, we find a non significant parameter for the smoke dummy
variable. This should not be interpreted ad a negative evidence about the link between
smoking and drinking since we should take into account that participation and consumption
are treated separately. In the participation equation (see Table 5) the parameter is positive
and strongly significant, indicating a possible gateway eﬀect between alcohol and tobacco.
The non significant parameter in the demand equation states that there is not a positive
relation between expenditure on alcohol and the fact of being a smoker. In other words, a
smoker has a higher probability of being a drinker, but smoking does not influence how much
one drinks.
The parameters of the sharing rule tell us that the husband’s share of total expenditure
is negatively influenced by the price of male clothing. If the husband is more educated than
his wife, the eﬀect will be of an increase in its share of household resources, and the same
happens if the husband is older than the wife. These parameters are all significant.
Table 6 shows (double-sided numerical) income elasticities, compensated price elasticities
and standard deviations derived via delta method. Own-price elasticities are consistent with
consumption theory. According to their size, education and recreation is the most elastic
good to price and income changes, while alcohol is one of the less elastic. Alcohol own-price
elasticity is the smallest of the group of goods, suggesting that a policy of an increased taxa-
tion on alcoholic beverages may not have much success in reducing consumption.14 Therefore,
in cases of price variations, it is plausible that individuals substitute other goods for alcohol.
Education and recreation has by far the most variable elasticities, suggesting that within this
group of goods it may be used as a buﬀer for income or price shocks.
14 It could be argued, however, that the increased taxation may serve to compensate for the negative social
eﬀects produced by alcohol abuse.
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Other elasticities are as expected and in line with usual findings in the literature.
To detail further the intra-household income distribution analysis, we have depicted fig-
ures 1 through 4, which represent the relative husband sharing rule, expressed as the ratio be-
tween husband expenditure and total household expenditure (lnφm(·)/ ln yh). These pictures
are drawn by means of nonparametric regressions of the sharing rule by total expenditure,
selecting groups of households with some characteristics of interest.
In Figure 1, we select a group of abstemious households and a group of heavy15 alcohol con-
sumers. The sharing rule is diﬀerent in these groups, with the husband being favoured in the
distribution of resources when alcohol consumption is large, especially for low income house-
holds. A t-test performed on the average sharing rules for strong drinkers and abstemious
confirms that there is a positive diﬀerence with a confidence level of 99%.16 According to this
analysis, alcohol consumption seems to cause a household income distribution modification
with respect to abstemious households which could motivate a policy intervention.
In Figure 2 we further investigate the relation between alcohol consumption and the shar-
ing rule. Selecting households by its main drinker,17 the sharing rule shifts towards the main
drinker himself/herself, except for households with low total expenditure, where even when
the main drinker is the wife, the sharing rule is still shifted towards the husband.18 When
the main drinker is the man the eﬀect is evident and could be explained by a combination
of several factors. Among other causes, there could be the fact that men tend to have a
overbearing behavior more frequently than women, and this tendency may be strengthened
by alcohol, which makes them more self confident and violent. This could also explain why
when the main drinker is the wife the distribution of resources still favours the husband when
the household is poor.19 In these households there could be a despotic husband which tends
to keep control on household resources and to impose his decisions. In such a situation, it
may happen that the wife falls into depression and/or uses alcohol as a mean to “escape from
that reality”.
The situation depicted by Figure 1 and 2 justifies a policy intervention. However, as
stated above, a strategy based on direct taxation is likely to have a small impact. The
problem is more serious for low income households and a price increase may even worsen
their situation. Instead, we are in favour of gender specific policies with the aim of balancing
the decisional power within the household. Just as an example, subsidies for poor households
or children subsidies should be given to woman. In this way the wife gains bargaining power
and there is less probability that the money is spent on alcohol both because she feels more
self confident or because the husband has less money to spend on alcohol. This policy, which
has been implemented with much success for micro-credit policies in developing countries, has
no additional costs and could bring a noticeable welfare improvement to those households.
Figure 3 plots the sharing rule by the household head’s education. The picture shows
that less education generates a distribution of resources in favour of the husband for middle
and low income households, while for households with higher level of income the situation
is unchanged. This seems to be in contrast with the positive sign of the edu-r parameter in
the sharing rule, which indicates that the member with higher education will have a greater
15We consider heavy consumers households which have an alcohol budget share above 0.035.
16The abstemius sharing rule has an average value of 4.17 with a standard deviation of 0.38 over a subsample
of 760 observations, while the strong drinker sharing rule has an average value of 4.30 with a standard deviation
of 0.37 over a subsample of 175 observation. The test value is 4.08 with 933 degree of freedom, which largely
rejects the null hypothesis of a diﬀerence equal to zero.
17The household member is the main consumer if he/she consumes at least 75% of household alcohol
consumption.
18Remember that represented is always the husband sharing rule, hence, a higher line means that the
husband is favoured, while a lower line means that the wife is favoured.
19 In poor households there is a higher probability that the wife does not work and in psychology there is
evidence that housewives may feel subjugated and tend to drink more.
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amount of household resources. However this is not a real contrast since the parameter only
captures the relative education, and not the level itself.
Figure 4 shows that the sharing rule is scarcely influenced by macro-regional divisions.
There is a diﬀerence for low income households, where South shows a distribution more in
favour of the husband. Looking at parameters in Table 4 we see that macro regions have
generally significant parameters, which means that consumption levels are diﬀerent across
macro regions, but that this diﬀerence does not always reflect much to the sharing rule.
The following section concludes and proposes future developments to this work.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we present some evidence that for Italian households an excessive alcohol
consumption can aﬀect the distribution of resources within the household. The results are
relatively strong, even for a country which is supposed to have a relatively advanced social
background.
When a significative amount of alcohol is consumed we find a systematic shift of the
sharing rule towards the husband. This shift is greater for low income households, implying
that the eﬀects of alcohol consumption on the intra-household income distribution are heavier
for low income households with a heavy drinker. This provides the rational for a policy
intervention aimed to contrast this phenomenon. However, since the own-price elasticity of
alcohol is the lowest across goods, we suggest that the proper policy should not be that of
increasing direct taxation on alcoholic beverages, since the price increase would probably be
shifted to other goods.20
Taking into account individual alcohol consumption, we find that the sharing rule shifts
toward the main drinker in the household, but with a substantial diﬀerence between the
husband and the wife. In fact, when the main drinker is the husband, the shift is evident in
the whole range of household income distributions.21 When the main drinker is the wife the
eﬀect is less evident, and for poor households, even when the main drinker is the wife, the
distribution of resources changes in favour of the husband. In this case the role of alcohol
in behavioral terms is less evident, but still can be explained, for instance as an increased
vulnerability of the drinker.
The generalized shift of resources toward the husband in the case of large alcohol con-
sumption is the sum of these two eﬀects. This means that the proper policy for the reduction
of the modification of the distribution of resources observed in the case of alcohol consumption
should be gender specific.
However, these issues need further investigations and we are planning future developments
to extend the analysis in several ways. The first extension regards the quality of data available.
We are building a new dataset to incorporate much more information on single household
components lifestyle, health, income and labour supply. This will be done by matching three
sources of data available in Italy in separate datasets provided by ISTAT and the Bank of
Italy.22
Regarding the estimation technique, we are investigating whether it could be more con-
venient to estimate the system by means of a Minimum Distance Estimator. This technique
would be much useful in treating the observed zero expenditures. To this extent, we could
20This is true only if we consider an aggregate alcohol good. If we are willing to diﬀerentiate taxation by
the alcohol content of each beverage, as spirits, wine and beer, the response would probably be diﬀerent, and
an increase taxation of spirits would probably shift consumption towards wine and beer. However, due to our
data, we cannot make this interesting analysis.
21The shift is still larger for poor households.
22 In this regard, the good results obtained by matching data on individual alcohol consumption incentives
us to proceed in this direction.
14
apply the proper zero correction technique to each good, allowing the use of specific correction
techniques like Double-Hurdle, Infrequent Purchases, and so on.
An interesting development would regard the Pareto eﬃciency of household consumption
choice. In our analysis, we do not explicitly take into account the possibility of ineﬃcient
resources allocation. However, the collective model would be a suitable instrument to answer
this question since it allows an estimation of individual income eﬀects. These income eﬀects
could be employed to test Pareto eﬃciency following the intuition of Browning, Bourguignon,
Chiappori, and Lechene (1994) and Udry (1996).
In the present work, we focus our attention to the distribution of resources between
husband and wife alone. We are working to extend the sharing rule in order to cover three
members of the household simultaneously (husband, wife and children). The usefulness of
such a specification is evident when evaluating the eﬀects of alcohol abuse, in which the looser
may be the children, the wife or both.
15
References
Amemiya, T. (1978): “On a Two-Step Estimationof a Multivariate Logit Model,” Journal
of Econometrics, 8, 13—21.
(1979): “The Estimation of a Simultaneous Equation Tobit Model,” International
Economic Review, 20(1), 169—81.
(1985): Advanced Econometrics. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts.
Arias, C., V. Atella, R. Castagnini, and F. Perali (2003): “Estimation of the Shar-
ing Rule Between Adults and Children and Related Equivalence Scales Within a Collec-
tive Consumption Framework,” in Household Behavior, Equivalence Scales, Welfare and
Poverty, ed. by C. Dagum, and G. Ferrari. Physica-Verlag.
Atella, V., M. Menon, and F. Perali (2003): “Estimation of Unit Values in Cross Sec-
tions Without Quantity Information,” in Household Welfare and Poverty, ed. by G. Ferrari,
and C. Dagum. Physica Verlag.
Atkinson, A. B., G. Gomulka, and N. H. Stern (1990): “Spending on Alcohol: Evidence
from the Family Expenditure Survey 1970-1983,” Economic Journal, 100, 808—27.
Banks, J., R. Blundell, and A. Lewbel (1997): “Quadratic Engel Curves and Consumer
Demand,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 79(4), 527—39.
Barten, A. P. (1964): “Family Composition, Prices and Expenditure Patterns,” in Econo-
metric Analysis for National Economic Planning: 16th Symposium of the Colston Society,
ed. by P. Hart, G. Mills, and J. K. Whitaker. Butterworth.
Becker, G. S., and K. Murphy (1988): “A Theory of Rational Addiction,” Journal of
Political Economy, 96, 675—700.
Bierens, H. J., and H. A. Pott-Buter (1987): “Specification of Household Engel Curves
by Nonparametric Regression,” Econometric Reviews, 9, 123—84.
Blundell, R., P. Pashardes, and G. Weber (1993): “What Do We Learn About Con-
sumer Demand Patterns from Micro-Data?,” American Economic Review, 83, 570—97.
Bollino, C. A., F. Perali, and N. Rossi (2000): “Linear Household Technologies,”
Journal of Applied Econometrics, 15(3), 275—87.
Borelli, S., and F. Perali (2002): “Drug Consumption and Intra-Household Distribu-
tion of the Resources: The Case of Qat in an African Society,” in Household Behaviour,
Equivalence Scales and Well-Being, ed. by Dagum, and Ferrari, Collana Physica Verlag.
Springer.
Bourguignon, F. (1999): “The Cost of Children: May the Collective Approach to House-
hold Behavior Help?,” Journal of Population Economics, 12, 503—21.
Browning, M., F. Bourguignon, P. A. Chiappori, and V. Lechene (1994): “Incomes
and Outcomes: A Structural Model of Intrahousehold Allocation,” Journal of Political
Economy, 102(6), 1067—96.
Browning, M., P. A. Chiappori, and A. Lewbel (2007): “Estimating Consumption
Economies of Scale, Adult Equivalence Scales, and Household Bargaining Power,” forth-
coming.
16
Cherchye, L., B. de Rock, and F. Vermeulen (2008): “Economic Well-Being and
Poverty Among the Elderly: An Analysis Based on a Collective Consumption Model,”
Discussion paper.
Chiappori, P. A. (1988): “Rational Household Labor Supply,” Econometrica, 56(1), 63—90.
(1992): “Collective Labor Supply and Welfare,” Journal of Political Economy,
100(3), 437—67.
Chiappori, P. A., and I. Ekeland (2002): “The Micro Economics of Group Behavior:
Identification,” working paper, Department of Economics, University of Chicago.
(2006): “The Micro Economics of Group Behavior: General Characterization,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 127(1), 1—26.
Chiappori, P. A., B. Fortin, and G. Lacroix (2002): “Marriage Market, Divorce Leg-
islation, and Household Labor Supply,” Journal of Political Economy, 110(1), 37—72.
Contreras, D., E. Frankenberg, and D. Thomas (.1997): “Child Health and the Dis-
tribution of Household Resources at Marriage,” Discussion paper, UCLA, Mimeo RAND.
Deaton, A. S., and J. Muellbauer (1980): “An Almost Ideal Demand System,” American
Economic Review, 70, 321—26.
Epstein, L., and S. Shi (1993): “Habits and Time Preference,” International Economic
Review, 34, 61—84.
Gill, L., and A. Lewbel (1992): “Testing the Rank of Estimated Matrices with Appli-
cations to Factors, State Space, and ARMA Models,” Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 87, 766—76.
Goldberger, A. S. (1972): “Maximum-Likelihood Estimation of Regressions Containing
Unobservable Independent Variables,” International Economic Review, 13(1), 1—15.
Golub, G. H., and C. F. VanLoan (1983): Matrix Computations. John Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore.
Gorman, W. M. (1976): “Tricks with Utility Functions,” in Proceedings of the 1975 AUTE
Conference, Essays in Economic Analysis, ed. by M. J. Artis, and A. R. Nobay. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Gruber, J., and B. Köszegi (2001): “Is Addiction "rational"? Theory and Evidence,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(4), 1261—1303.
Härdle, W., and M. Jerison (1988): “The Evolution of Engel Curves over Time,” Dis-
cussion Paper A-178, SFB 303, University of Bonn.
Hausman, J. A., W. K. Newey, and J. L. Powell (1995): “Nonlinear Errors in Variables:
Estimation of some Engel Curves,” Journal of Econometrics, 65, 205—33.
Heckman, J. (1979): “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error,” Econometrica, 47(1),
153—61.
Heien, D., and C. R. Wessells (1990): “Demand Systems Estimation with Microdata: A
Censored Regression Approach,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 8, 365—71.
17
Hildebrand, W. (1994): Market Demand: Theory and Empirical Evidence. Princeton Uni-
veristy Press, Princeton.
Leser, C. E. V. (1963): “Forms of Engel Functions,” Econometrica, 31, 694—703.
Lewbel, A. (1985): “A Unified Approach to Incorporating Demograpic or Other Eﬀects
Into Demand Systems,” Review of Economic Studies, 70, 1—18.
(1989): “Identification and Estimation of Equivalence Scales under Weak Separa-
bility,” Review of Economic Studies, 56, 311—16.
(1991): “The Rank of Demand Systems: Theory and Nonparametric Estimation,”
Econometrica, 59, 711—30.
(2002): “Rank, Separability, and Conditional Demand,” Canadian Journal of Eco-
nomics, 35(2), 410—413.
Maddala, G. S. (1983): Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Pagan, A., and A. Ullah (1999): Nonparametric Econometrics. Cambridge University
Press, London.
Perali, F. (2003): The Behavioral and Welfare Analysis of Consumption. The Cost of
Children, Equity and Poverty in Colombia. Springer-Verlag.
Pollak, R., and T. J. Wales (1981): “Demographic Variables in Demand Analysis,”
Econometrica, 49(6), 1533—51.
Rubalcava, L., and D. Thomas (2000): “Family Bargaining and Welfare,” Discussion
Paper 00-10, RAND - Labor and Population Program.
Seccombe, W. (1995): Weathering the Storm. New York: Verso, London.
Shonkwiler, J. S., and S. T. Yen (1999): “Two-Step Estimation of a Censored System
of Equations,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 81, 972—982.
Silverman, S., and B. W. Silverman (1986): Density Estimation for Statistics and Data
Analysis. CRC Press.
Udry, C. (1996): “Gender, Agricultural Production and the Theory of the Household,”
Journal of Political Economy, 104(5), 1010—46.
Working, H. (1943): “Statistical Law of Family Expenditure,” Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 38, 43—56.
Yen, S. T. (1993): “Working Wives and Food Away from Home: The Box-Cox Double-
Hurdle Model,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 75, 884—95.
18
Appendix A: Non-parametric Engel curves and Rank Test
Engel curves are a widely used tool to assess the relationship between consumption and
income. They have been studied for a long time, but still there is no agreement on which
functional form is best suited to describe this relationship. According to the early work
of Working (1943) and Leser (1963) Engel curves could be considered linear in the log of
income, but later studies, among which Atkinson, Gomulka, and Stern (1990), Bierens and
Pott-Buter (1987), Blundell, Pashardes, and Weber (1993), Hausman, Newey, and Powell
(1995), Härdle and Jerison (1988), Hildebrand (1994), and Lewbel (1991), have shown that
this specification is rather poor in describing Engel curves for some goods. The general
evidence on micro-data is in favour of a quadratic relationship between budget shares and
the log of total expenditure,23 i.e. a rank 3 demand system.24
Even if there is some general agreement on the use of quadratic Engel curves, we provide
nonparametric evidence to verify the rank of the demand system. We use single equation
non-parametric Engel curve estimation,25 and model the budget share of each good to be a
non-linear function of the natural logarithm of total expenditure. Following Banks, Blundell,
and Lewbel (1997) and Perali (2003), we plot in Figure 5 non-parametric estimates of alcohol
individual Engel curves (orange line) and its 95% confidence interval (blue dashed lines).
Similarly in Figure 6 we plot clothing individual Engel curves. Figure 7 represents household
level Engel curves for food, education and recreation and other goods. In each graph also a
quadratic polynomial regression (purple line) is plotted. The purpose is to verify whether a
quadratic relationship can fit within the Engel’s curves confidence intervals. Finally, along
with Engel curves, we present nonparametric kernel bivariate density estimates and contour
density plots.
A graphical analysis shows that the relation between food, alcohol for the wife, female
clothing and total log expenditure can be represented by a linear functional form, while
all other goods except male clothing exhibit a shape rather close to a quadratic function.
However, considering the confidence interval, a quadratic form cannot be excluded for clothing
either.
To deepen the analysis we perform a non-parametric rank test for the demand system
(Gill and Lewbel, 1992). This test does not need the specification of a functional form for
the demand system, and hence avoids specification errors. The test is based on the estimated
pivots of a matrix associating shares to functions of the total expenditure. The data matrix
is decomposed using the Lower-Diagonal-Upper (LDU) Gaussian elimination with complete
pivoting (Golub and VanLoan, 1983). The rank of each matrix equals the number of non-
zero elements of the diagonal matrix of pivots. The null hypothesis is tested against the
alternative that the rank is greater than r, and that the rank test is conducted sequentially,
starting with r = 1. The test evaluates the hypothesis that only pivot d1 is significantly
diﬀerent from 0, and consequentially all remaining p − r pivots are zero. The results of the
rank test, summarized in Table 3, show that the system can be considered a rank 3 with a
p-value of 0.997, which indicates that the choice of a quadratic demand system is likely to be
correct.
23Total expenditure is often used in cross section analysis when no reliable information on income is available.
This is also our case.
24Following Lewbel (2002), we define the rank of a demand system as the maximum dimension of the
function space spanned by the Engel curves.
25We perform a local polynomial regression of first degree. The bandwidth value is the same for all the
goods and is rather larger than the Silverman and Silverman (1986) Rule-of-thumb. Since we do not need
much punctual information and we have a small sample, the choice of a large bandwidth allows to reduce noise
without compromising the information we are looking for. The analysis is conducted using the Nonparametrix
package for Mathematica provided by Bernard Gress, which refer to the technique described in Pagan and
Ullah (1999).
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Figure 5: Alcohol Engel curves for the husband and the wife
  
Figure 6: Clothing Engel curves for the husband and the wife
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Figure 7: Household Engel curves
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Appendix B: Derivation of the Collective Quadratic Demo-
graphically modified AIDS
The budget shares specification of a Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QAIDS) is
wi(y
h,p) = αi +
X
j
γji ln pj + βi (ln y − ln a(p)) +
λi
b(p)
³
ln yh − ln a(p)
´2
, (11)
where wi(y,p) is the good i budget share, αi, γij , βi and λi are parameters, pj is price of
good j and yh is total household expenditure. a(p) and b(p) are two price indexes, defined
as
ln a(p) = α0 +
X
i
αi ln pi +
1
2
X
i
X
j
γij ln pi ln pj
ln b(p) =
X
i
βi ln pi, or, in antilog b(p) =
Y
i
pβii .
When demographic translation is introduced, budget shares are modified as follows
wi(y
h,p) = wi(y
h,p, ti(d)),
where t(d) is a translating function and d is a vector of demographic variables or household
characteristics.
Similarly to the Slutsky decomposition of income and substitution eﬀects, the demo-
graphic specification translates the budget line via demographic characteristics (income scal-
ing).
Applying this transformation to equation (11), we obtain the following demographically
modified budget share equation
wi(yh,p,d) = αi+ ti(d)+
X
j
γji ln pj+βi
³
ln yh∗ − ln a(p)
´
+
λi
b(p)
³
ln yh∗ − ln a(p)
´2
,
where
ln yh∗ = ln yh −
X
i
ti(d) ln pi,
ti(d) =
X
r
τ ir ln dr,
In order to comply with homogeneity properties of the demand system, the demographic
specification of the budget shares demand system is subject to a number of restrictions on
the parameters. In particular, to satisfy linear homogeneity in p and Slutsky symmetry the
following restrictions must holdX
i
αi = 1;
X
i
βi = 0;
X
i
λi = 0;
X
i
γij = 0;
X
j
γij = 0; γij = γji;
X
i
τ ir = 0.
To obtain the collective demographically modified QAIDS, the next step is to introduce
the sharing rule. The maximization problem in (1) states that the sharing rule determines
the amount of resources that each household member receives. Each member decides how
to allocate his share of total expenditure, and the observed household budget share will be
equal to
wi = αi + ti(d) +
X
j
γji ln pj + β
m
i (lnφ
m∗ − ln a(p))
+
λmi
bm(p)
(lnφm∗ − ln a(p))2 + βfi
³
lnφf∗ − ln a(p)
´
+
λfi
bf (p)
³
lnφf∗ − ln a(p)
´2
,
where lnφm∗ and lnφf∗ are demographically scaled sharing rules.
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Appendix C: Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics - Goods - 1947 obs.
Trunc. % Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Shares
Food 0 0.315 0.128 0.011 0.733
Alcohol 39.03 0.013 0.020 0 0.275
Clothing 0 0.193 0.118 0.003 0.817
Education and Recreation 10.38 0.095 0.133 0 0.843
Other consumption 0 0.385 0.141 0.035 0.915
Other relevant shares
Clothing for men 0 0.082 0.063 0.002 0.580
Clothing for women 0 0.093 0.071 0.002 0.520
Total expenditure and Prices1
Total expenditure 7.396 0.512 5.728 9.050
Food 7.993 0.222 6.945 8.638
Alcohol 5.154 0.155 4.683 5.541
Clothing 7.174 0.130 6.482 7.354
Clothing for men 6.108 0.176 5.798 6.435
Clothing for women 6.897 0.183 6.562 7.239
Education and Recreation 6.919 0.179 6.517 7.202
Other consumption 8.925 0.215 7.886 9.420
Note: 1. Values are expressed as natural logarithms.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics - Demographic variables - 1947 obs.
Mean Std. Dev Min Max
North-east 0.294 0.456 0 1
North-west 0.214 0.410 0 1
Center 0.184 0.388 0 1
December 0.100 0.300 0 1
Rural 0.156 0.363 0 1
Employee 0.653 0.476 0 1
Smoke 0.361 0.480 0 1
University 0.156 0.363 0 1
Price ratio 0.314 0.047 0.203 0.454
Edu. ratio 0.498 0.095 0 1
Age ratio 0.518 0.026 0.311 0.691
2003 dum 0.333 0.471 0 1
2004 dum 0.328 0.470 0 1
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Table 3: Rank test
Rank r=1 r=2 r=3 r=4
test 51.60 4.44 0.005 0.000
p-value 0.000 0.217 0.997 1.000
Table 4: Parameters of the demand system - 1947 obs.
param. food alcohol clothing edu.-rec. others
αi -0.470∗∗∗ (0.090) 0.116∗∗∗ (0.044) 1.094∗∗∗ (0.113) 0.668∗∗∗ (0.099) -0.408∗∗∗ (0.086)
γij -0.068∗∗ (0.027) -0.008 (0.006) -0.073∗∗∗ (0.024) -0.030 (0.017) 0.178∗∗∗ (0.016)
0.001 (0.005) 0.012 (0.009) 0.008 (0.005) -0.013 (0.008)
0.040 (0.041) 0.125∗∗∗ (0.017) -0.104∗∗∗ (0.025)
-0.096∗∗∗ (0.022) -0.008 (0.021)
-0.053 (0.028)
βmi -0.186∗∗∗ (0.030) -0.003 (0.010) 0.273∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.115∗∗∗ (0.029) -0.198∗∗∗ (0.039)
βfi -0.125∗∗∗ (0.036) 0.049∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.241∗∗∗ (0.037) 0.105∗∗∗ (0.035) -0.270∗∗∗ (0.036)
λmi -0.020∗∗∗ (0.006) -0.002 (0.002) 0.050∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.000 (0.005) -0.029∗∗∗ (0.005)
λfi -0.002 (0.003) 0.005∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.018∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.000 (0.013) -0.021∗∗∗ (0.004)
ηi - -0.009 (0.009) - -0.118 (0.088) -
Demographic variables
north-east -0.034∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.007∗∗∗ (0.002) -0.020∗∗∗ (0.007) -0.012 (0.013) 0.059∗∗∗ (0.018)
north-west -0.034∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.008∗∗∗ (0.003) -0.021∗∗∗ (0.007) -0.011 (0.011) 0.059∗∗∗ (0.016)
center -0.026∗∗∗ (0.009) -0.001 (0.002) -0.015∗∗ (0.007) 0.003 (0.011) 0.040∗∗∗ (0.015)
december 0.001 (0.009) 0.006∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.010 (0.008) -0.025∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.008 (0.010)
university -0.017∗∗ (0.008) -0.001 (0.002) 0.015∗∗ (0.007) 0.016∗∗ (0.007) -0.014 (0.008)
dep. worker 0.003 (0.006) -0.002 (0.002) 0.009 (0.005) -0.014∗∗ (0.006) 0.005 (0.007)
rural -0.001 (0.007) 0.001 (0.002) -0.013∗∗ (0.007) 0.002 (0.008) 0.0011 (0.010)
smoke -0.008 (0.006) -0.002 (0.002) -0.014∗∗∗ (0.005) -0.016∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.040∗∗∗ (0.007)
year 2003 -0.004 (0.007) -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.006) -0.006 (0.006) 0.012 (0.007)
year 2004 -0.006 (0.007) -0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.007) -0.010 (0.006) 0.017∗∗ (0.008)
price-r edu-r age-r
sharing rule -1.475∗∗∗ (0.403) 0.436∗∗ (0.218) 1.577∗∗∗ (0.526)
∗∗ Denotes significant parameters at 5% significance level, ∗∗∗ at 1 %
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 5: Parameters of the participation equatuions - 1947 obs.
alcohol education&recreation
constant 0.150 (0.138) 0.802∗∗∗ (0.165)
December 0.056 (0.098) -0.039 (0.126)
north-east -0.390∗∗∗ (0.114) 0.789∗∗∗ (0.136)
north-west -0.559∗∗∗ (0.118) 0.611∗∗∗ (0.140)
center -0.233 (0.122) 0.571∗∗∗ (0.142)
south (no isles) -0.229 (0.119) 0.115 (0.127)
rural 0.196∗∗ (0.083) -0.213∗∗ (0.101)
age 0.058∗∗∗ (0.013) -0.011 (0.017)
smoke 0.274∗∗∗ (0.062) 0.205∗∗ (0.084)
husband dep. worker 0.048 (0.066) 0.033 (0.087)
wife dep. worker -0.004 (0.065) 0.053 (0.086)
∗∗ Denotes significant parameters at 5% significance level, ∗∗∗ at 1 %.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 6: Income and price elasticities
income elasticities
food alcohol clothing edu.-rec. other
0.732 (0.384) 0.988 (0.702) 1.040 (0.651) 2.022 (5.328) 0.920 (0.760)
compensated price elasticities
food alcohol clothing edu.-rec. other
food -1.401 (0.735) 0.027 (0.012) 0.302 (0.131) 0.286 (0.232) 0.322 (0.142)
alcohol 0.034 (0.015) -1.177 (0.837) -0.246 (0.124) 0.056 (0.050) 0.353 (0.174)
clothing 0.080 (0.035) -0.017 (0.058) -1.635 (1.023) 0.326 (0.309) 0.168 (0.081)
edu.-rec. 0.178 (0.144) -0.098 (0.088) -0.420 (0.399) -3.185 (8.392) 0.481 (0.450)
other 0.271 (0.120) 0.023 (0.011) 0.178 (0.087) 0.227 (0.212) -1.540 (1.272)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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